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In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litia., 516 F.3d 688 (8th Cir.
2008)
Missouri claimed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
made revisions to the 2004 Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir Master
Water Control Manual (the "Master Manual") in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by failing to provide a supplemental
environment impact statement ("SEIS") with the revisions. The Corps
revised the Master Manual to address changes needed in the current
Missouri River water control plan in order to protect wildlife determined
to be at risk by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") under the
Endangered Species Act. The FWS suggested different courses of action
for the Corps to take in a Biological Opinion ("BiOp"), the most
significant being a "spring rise" or a 30-day controlled water release from
Gavins Point Dam every three years.
The Corps identified five choices for modifying the water
control plan; four were Gavins Point Dam spring rise/summer low flow
release alternatives modeled after the FWS's Reasonable and Prudent
Alternative ("RPA") in its BiOp, and the fifth option was a Modified
Conservation Plan which did not involve a spring rise. The Corps' Final
Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") chose the fifth option,
observing that the plan could violate the Endangered Species Act because
it did not include a spring rise, as recommended by the FWS, to protect the
species at risk. The FWS indicated that the Corps had two years in which
to devise a plan with effects similar to a spring rise, or the FWS would
compel the Corps to adopt a "default plan" which would include a spring
nse.
The Corps implemented the Modified Conservation Plan in
its 2004 Master Plan, noting that it would still consider a spring rise as
required by the FWS's BiOp, and organized a Plenary Group in 2005 to
help in addressing this. The Corps then issued a draft of an Annual
Operating Plan and technical specifications for a Spring Pulse Water
Control plan for public comment; this plan included a bimodal spring rise
from the Gavins Point Dam. After comparing this bimodal spring rise
plan to its prior five plan modification options, the Corps issued an
environmental assessment ("EA") with its analysis, and stated that the
bimodal spring rise plan did not require a supplement document to the
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Corps' prior FEIS because the bimodal spring rise plan did not pose any
new environmental impacts not already addressed by the Corps' prior
FEIS. Missouri filed suit to enjoin implementation of the Corps' spring
rise plan as spring rises threaten downstream flood control.
The Minnesota district court held that the Corps did not
violate the NEPA in not preparing an SEIS or a finding of no significant
impact ("FONSI") document for the bimodal spring rise plan to
supplement its EA, and granted the Corps' motion for summary judgment.
Missouri appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that
because the prior Modified Conservation Plan did not involve a spring
rise, an SEIS was needed because implementing the bimodal spring rise
was a "substantial change" from the Corps' prior plan. The court rejected
this argument, stating that changes which were considered in a prior FEIS
and rejected were not "substantial changes" requiring an SEIS under 40
C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(I). The court indicated that a "substantial change"
would need to be one "not qualitatively within the spectrum of
alternatives" discussed in a prior FEIS in order to require an SEIS.
Missouri also argued that because none of the Corps'
spring rise options in the FEIS were bimodal, an SEIS was required. The
court rejected this argument also and found that the Corps' decision to not
prepare an SEIS was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act standard. The court noted that the Corps' EA document
compared the bimodal spring rise plan's effects to the four spring rise
options in the FEIS, and concluded that there were no "significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns"
necessitating an SEIS for the bimodal spring rise plan.
Missouri closed by claiming that in neglecting to issue an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") or FONSI with the EA, the
Corps violated the NEPA. The court refused this argument as well,
finding that since neither the Corps nor the Council on Environmental
Quality's ("CEQ") regulations had set procedures on how to determine
when an SEIS is needed, it was appropriate for the Corps to decide not to
issue an SEIS in this case, especially since the effects of the bimodal
spring rise plan had already been evaluated in the prior FEIS. As a result,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
SHEILA NEEDLES

U.S. v. Lucas, 2008 WL 274401 (5th Cir. 2008)
In Lucas, the court decision resolved an appeal from violations of
the Clean Water Act (CWA) and conspiracy to violate the CWA by a
corporate developer and various individuals who sold house lots and
designed and certified septic systems for mobile homes on wetlands.
Robert Lucas owned Big Hills Acre, Inc. (BHA, Inc.) and Consolidated
Investments, Inc. He purchased a large parcel of land in Jackson County,
Mississippi about eight miles from the Gulf of Mexico, which was called
Big Hill Acres (BHA). Mr. Lucas sold mobile home lots from this
property, however, the land was not connected to a central municipal
waste system and the law required him to certify and install individual
septic systems on each lot before he could sell them. In Jackson County,
septic tanks must be approved by an engineer with the Mississippi
Department of Health (MDH) or by an independent licensed engineer. Mr.
Lucas originally used a MDH engineer to approve the septic systems, but,
after finding out that the lots were on land that was saturated, the MDH
withdrew many of its initial approvals. Mr. Lucas was forced to hire a
private licensed engineer, M.E. Thompson, Jr. in order to have the septic
systems approved. After the approval, Mr. Lucas's daughter, Robbie
Lucas Wrigley, advertised the lots, showed them to buyers, and leased
them.
After becoming concerned that Mr. Lucas was building houses and
installing septic tanks on lots located on a wetland, the Army Corps of
Engineers, the EPA, the MDH, and the Mississippi Department of
Environmental quality (DEQ) issued multiple cease and desist orders
against Mr. Lucas and Mr. Thompson. Additionally, the EPA sent letters
to residents in BHA to warn them of the conditions of the lots and to
inform them that wetlands were located on the property. The agency also
met with BHA's counsel to authorize areas where it would allow
development. However, when these efforts did not prove to be fruitful, the
Government filed a 41-count indictment against Mr. Lucas, his company,
and Mr. Thompson, charging them with the filling of wetlands without a
Section 404 permit from the Corps, failing to obtain Section 403 National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits of the septic
tanks, mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and for violating
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Sections 402 and 404 of the CWA. A jury convicted the Defendants on all
counts and the Defendants appealed that decision.
The court first addressed the issues of jurisdiction by the federal
government over this claim by way of the CWA. First, the court found that
the federal government did have jurisdiction because the wetland located
of BHA property had a significant nexus to a navigable-in-act body of
water and all of the connecting bodies of water flow into the Gulf of
Mexico. The second jurisdiction issue involved the sufficiency of evidence
to establish jurisdiction under the CWA. The court found that a rational
trier of fact could have found the evidence established the elements of the
claim beyond a reasonable doubt. The last issue regarding jurisdiction was
that the CWA as applied to the regulation of wetlands was
unconstitutionally vague. However, the court found that Mr. Lucas had
sufficient notice of his violation of the CWA and state law by installing
the septic systems and because his property had saturated soil with a
network of creeks and tributaries leading to the Gulf of Mexico, some of
which connected to the wetlands on his property.
The next issue addressed by the court dealt with the challenges to
the sufficiency of the indictment and the jury instructions regarding the
CWA's NPDES permitting requirements. In regards to the sufficiency of
the indictment, the court found the evidence produced at trial was
sufficient to support a finding that the septic systems were point sources
and could be subject to NPDES permitting requirements under the CWA.
Second, the court held that the jury instruction allowing a conviction for
"causing" the discharge of pollutants was not an abuse of discretion
because, although the individual lot owners used the septic systems that
discharged the pollutants, Mr. Lucas was the cause of the operation and its
unlawful discharge from the systems. The court affirmed the district
court's decision on all counts.
BREANNE ARDILA

N.J. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2008 WL 341338 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
New Jersey and fourteen additional States, the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, the City of Baltimore and various
environmental organizations challenged two final rules promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regarding the emission of
hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs") from electric utility steam generating
units ("EGUs"). The first rule ("the Delisting Rule") removed coal-andoil fired EGUs from the list of sources whose emissions are regulated
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The second rule, the
Clean Air Mercury Rule ("CAMR"), set performance standards for new
coal-fired EGUs under section 111, created total mercury emissions limits
for states and established a voluntary cap-and-trade program for new and
existing coal-fired EGUs. The two rules had the effect of shifting EPA
regulation of power-plant emissions of mercury from the significantly
more stringent standards of section 112 (governing HAPs) to the less
stringent and more flexible standards under CAA section 11 (authorizing
national emission standards for new stationary sources).
The CAA allows states to set emission limitations for individual
stationary sources, such as power plants and factories. In general, the
states have considerable flexibility as long as the cumulative effect of
emissions within a state does not cause levels to exceed national air
quality standards set by the EPA or other CAA requirements. However,
for particularly harmful pollutants (HAPs), section 112 requires EPA to
set uniform national standards for each category of stationary sources
listed by EPA. Also, section 111 subjects newly constructed and newly
modified stationary sources to EPA-prescribed "new source performance
standards" (NSPSs).
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA, narrowing the EPA's
discretion in implementing section 112 by requiring EPA to meet certain
conditions before adding EGUs to the list of regulated HAP sources.
Particularly, EPA is required to perform a study of anticipated hazards to
public health that would occur as a result of emissions by EGUs, and if
EPA determines that regulation is "appropriate and necessary" after
considering the results of the study, it would regulate EGUs under section
112 (thereby setting uniform national standards). After completing a
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study in 1998 and finding that that mercury emissions from EGUs present
significant hazards to public health and the environment, EPA announced
in 2000 that it was "appropriate and necessary" to regulate coal-and-oil
fired EGUs under section 112. Accordingly, EPA added coal-and-oil fired
EGUs to the section 112(c)(1) list of source categories. Under a consent
agreement, the listing required the agency to propose Maximum
Achievable Control Technology standards for those facilities by
December, 2003 and finalize the standards by March, 2005.
However, contrary to its 2000 announcement, in 2005 EPA
removed EGUs from the section 112 list and regulated mercury emissions
from new coal-fired EGUs under section 111 instead, stating that
regulation under section 112 was not "appropriate and necessary" after all.
As a result, EPA claimed authority pursuant to section 111 to establish a
national mercury emissions cap for new and existing EGUs and allocated
a mercury emissions budget to each state along with a voluntary cap-andtrade program. The program would have allowed utilities to either control
the pollutant directly or purchase excess allowances from other plants that
have instituted controls more stringently or sooner than required. Also,
early reductions could have been banked for later use. While this system
would allow for more flexibility, it would have significantly delayed the
reduction of overall emissions.
The petitioners contended EPA violated section 112's plain text
and structure when it delisted the EGUs from section 112(c)(1). They
argued that once EPA determined in 2000 that EGUs should be regulated
under Section 112 and listed them under section 112(c)(1), EPA had no
authority to delist them without taking the steps required under section
112(c)(9), such as determining that emissions would not exceed a level
adequate to protect public health and finding that no adverse
environmental effects would result from the emissions. EPA conceded
that it never made the findings section 112(c)(9) would require.
Therefore, the court agreed that EPA's removal of EGUs from section 112
violated the CAA's plain text.
In an attempt to evade the CAA's plain text, EPA argued that it
possessed authority to remove EGUs from section 112 list under the
principle of administrative law that an agency has inherent authority to
reverse an earlier administrative ruling. The court agreed that an agency
can normally change its position, but Congress can limit and agency's

discretion to reverse itself, and in section 112(c)(9), Congress did just that,
unambiguously limiting EPA's discretion to remove sources. Also, EPA
argued that it had previously removed sources from section 112 without
satisfying the requirements of section 112(c)(9), but the court found that
previous violations do not excuse the violation currently before the court.
Therefore, the court vacated the agency's delisting rule and
required vacation and remand of its section 111 regulations for mercury
emissions from new and existing EGUs. Because section 112 does not
authorize EPA to establish a cap-and-trade program, EPA will also have to
impose Maximum Achievable Control Technology standards on each
individual EGU listed in section 112. The decision is a setback to the
Bush administration's efforts to provide flexibility and ease restrictions for
coal-fired power plants.
MICHAEL J. QUILLIN
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Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Inlet Fisheries Inc., 2008 WL
351688 (9th Cir. 2008)
Inlet Fisheries, Inc. and Inlet Fish Producers, Inc., (together known
as "Inlet") are businesses that buy and process fish out of Alaska. The
Underwriters at Lloyds are those syndicates at Lloyd's of London who
agreed to underwrite a stand-alone pollution insurance policy issued to
Inlet in August 2000. The prior provider of stand-along vessel pollution
insurance was Water Quality Insurance Syndicate ("WQIS"). WQIS sent
notice in August 2000 that it was canceling the insurance for numerous
reasons, including Inlet's failure to conduct surveys of its vessels as
requested by WQIS because several vessels had spilled or sunk with
thousands of gallons of oil on board. A day after the cancellation notice
was sent, another one of Inlet's vessels spilled approximately 55 gallons of
oil off the coast of Alaska.
Inlet then sought insurance from Lloyds for its remaining vessels.
It is what Inlet provided on the application that is in dispute in the instant
case. In the response to "pollution loss history," Inlet wrote "None." The
form did not ask for information about Inlet's vessels, financial status, or
reasons for WQIS's reasons for cancellation. Two years later in August
2002, another one of Inlet's vessels sank and spilled oil. Inlet made a
claim to Lloyds under its vessel pollution insurance, and Lloyds
investigated the accident and Inlet in general. Lloyds filed suit seeking
declaratory judgment to void the policy ab initio under the doctrine of
uberrimae fidei after it learned about the previous oil spills, the poor
condition of the vessels and a pending bankruptcy. Inlet tried to argue that
Alaska state law applied, but the district court granted Lloyd's motion and
ruled that the federal rule of uberrimae fidei applied.
The doctrine of ubberimae fidei means that both parties to an
insurance contract were held to the highest standard of good faith. It is
required that the insured fully and voluntarily discloses to the insured all
material facto to a calculation of insurance risk. The issue here is that
Lloyds did not ask for this information, but under ubberimae fidei, Inlet
should have disclosed this information voluntarily. The Sixth Circuit held
that a life insurance policy was void under ubberimae fidei because the
insured failed to disclose two heart attacks. The Fifth Circuit held an in
insurance policy void in the maritime context when the insured failed to

disclose the poor condition of its boats. The Supreme Court held in
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) courts
should look to federal admiralty law first, and if non available, then state
law may be used. Inlet tried to argue that ubberimae fidei was not a
established maritime law, but the Court disagrees. The Eleventh Circuit
stated that ubberimae fidei was the controlling law in that court, and this
court agreed.
This court also agreed with other circuits in applying ubberimae
fidei as an disclosure issue and not one of solicitation. This is an big area
of dispute between the two parties. Inlet argues that Lloyds did not solicit
information about its business history, however the real issue is whether
Inlet knew of material information that it failed to disclose. Lloyds was
able to prove with more than sufficient evidence that the prior oil spills,
the sunken ship and WQIS's cancellation of its insurance was enough to
affect its decision to offer the insurance.
JERRI ZHANG
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City of Dallas, Texas v. Hall, 2007 WL 3125311 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
The City of Dallas, Texas (the "City") and the Texas Water
Development Board (the "State") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") claimed to
have been considering land around the upper Neches River for the Fastrill
Reservoir. Meanwhile, as early as 1985, the Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") asserted they began considering the same land as a site for the
Neches River National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge"). The City sought to
collaborate with FWS to meet the dual goals of water supply and wildlife
preservation, but negotiations between the parties never realized a plan
encompassing both parties' interests. As a result, on June 11, 2006, the
Director of FWS stated time for collaboration had ended and approved the
FWS' Environmental Assessment ("EA") and subsequent Finding of No
Significant Impact ("FONSI"), designating the disputed land as a refuge.
To this end, FWS began quickly acquiring land and obtained a one-acre
conservation easement from James and Annie Younts ("the Younts").
The City and State filed separate, similar lawsuits against FWS, the
United States Department of the Interior (collectively, "Federal
Defendants") and the Younts. These lawsuits were consolidated and
transferred to United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. At issue in the instant case are [1] the Federal Defendants' partial
motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims and [2] the Younts' motion to
dismiss. The City's alleges [1] Federal Defendants failed to comply with
executive orders 13,132 and 13,352; [2] the one-acre conservation
easement is void because it is contrary to the requirements of the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act ("NWRSAA") and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"); [3] the FWS violated the APA by
accepting the one-acre easement in bad faith; and [4] the Federal
Defendants prevented the City from securing a sufficient water supply for
its citizens in violation of the Tenth Amendment and the City's right to
sovereignty. Also at issue are the State's substantially similar claims
including [1] violation of the executive orders and [2] the one-acre
conservation easement is void as a matter of the Texas Natural Resources
Code.
To the claim that it violated executive orders 13,132 and 13,352,
Federal Defendants responded the executive orders created no private
right of action. Plaintiffs' nonetheless claimed non-compliance with the

executive orders was a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). In dismissing Plaintiffs' claims, the court reasoned that
because Federal Defendants had not considered the executive orders in
their NEPA analysis, non-compliance with those executive orders was not
subject to the instant court's review.
In regards to the one-acre conservation easement, the City argued
the easement was void because the Federal Defendants failed to acquire
water rights to the land before acquiring the property in violation of
NWRSAA. The State argued FWS' easement was void as a matter of the
Texas Natural Resources Code. Federal Defendants responded [1] the
FWS' title can only be challenged through the Quiet Title Act ("QTA"),
under which the City has not asserted jurisdiction; [2] the City lacked
standing under NWRSAA because loss of opportunity to construct a
reservoir is not within the "zone of interest" NWRSAA protects; and [3]
NWRSAA does not require the acquisition of water rights before
acquisition of an easement. Because the City and State were not
challenging the federal government's title and did not possess the type of
property interest necessary for maintenance of a quiet title action, the court
concluded the QTA was inapplicable. However, the court agreed with
Federal Defendants in that the City lacked standing under NWRSAA and
the State lacked standing under the Texas Natural Resources Code.
Consequently, the court dismissed these claims.
Against the allegation they had accepted the one-acre conservation
easement in bad faith and in violation of the APA, Federal Defendants
argued the claim should be dismissed because APA review could only be
conducted within the meaning of a relevant statute, and the City had not
alleged a relevant statute for its bad faith claim. In dismissing the City's
claim, the court agreed there was no statutory basis for the APA claim, so
the City was not entitled to judicial review.
The City claimed the FWS had exceeded its authority by depriving
the City of its constitutional right to secure a water supply for its citizens
and violated the City's Tenth Amendment right to sovereignty. The court
concluded it could not accept the City's Tenth Amendment claim because
the bases for this claim were factual allegations in a brief, which could not
be considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court
also concluded the City had not provided any authority that it had a "right"
to secure a water supply for residents and dismissed the City's claims.
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Finally, the court addressed the Younts' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The City argued the Younts were an indispensable
party because they have an interest in the property that would be affected
by the court's ruling. The court granted the Younts' motion to dismiss
because the court had already dismissed the City's claims which would
have entitled the City to rescission of the one-acre conservation easement.
After dismissal of these claims, the Younts no longer had an interest in
property that would be affected by the court's ruling and were no longer
an indispensable party. The court granted the Younts' motion to dismiss.
After granting all Federal Defendants' and the Younts' motions to
dismiss, the City notified the court of its intention to amend its claim
against the conservation easement, adding the allegation that the FWS had
failed to comply with its own policies. The FWS had not secured
secretary approval of the easement; consequently, the City alleged the
easement was invalid and no refuge had been established. The court
granted Plaintiffs ten days to file a newly amended complaint.
JOSEPH SCHLOTZHAUER

U.S. v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2007)
In Brock-Davis, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to decide a
case determining the extent of restitution that is proper under the
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(A)
following a conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine.
On October 15, 2005 Defendant Brock-Davis and Codefendant
Perry Willingham checked into a motel room in Missoula, Montana.
Three days later, while the two defendants were temporarily away from
the room, a housekeeper discovered a white powdery substance and a
microwave oven in the room. Believing the items found to be part of a
meth lab, she notified the manager who then contacted the police. The
police arrested Both Brock-Davis and Willingham and during the search
of the trunk of their car, the police found other necessary components to
manufacture methamphetamine, including cold tablets, beakers, and liquid
methamphetamine.
Shortly after being arrested, Willingham told Missoula Police that
they better check the Aero Inn in Kalispell, specifically room 107. The
Missoula Police contacted the Kalispell police who did in fact check the
room and found more evidence consistent with a meth lab, as well as an
ice bucket with purple stains, a white powdery substance in the bathroom,
and a microwave oven box matching the microwave oven found in
Missoula. Brock-Davis was identified by one of the Aero Inn employees
as the patron renting the room. Defendant Brock-Davis was charged with
and plead guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine under 21
US.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846.
After the arrest the owner of the Aero Inn, Gilbert Bissell, on
suggestion from the police, spent two days with one of the housecleaners
cleaning room 107 with bleach. None the less, about a month later, the
Montana Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) notified Bissell
that room 107 had been listed as a "hazardous meth site," and thus
unsuitable for occupation. This was based on a report from the Kalispell
police. To have it taken off the list meant having it decontaminated by an
approved agency in a manner outlined in the Montana Administrative
Rules. Bissell hired WTR Consulting Engineers off of MDEQ's approved
list who proceeded over the next six months to decontaminate the room.
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This process included cleaning, disposing of the room's furniture, doors,
and having the room shut down for the six month period.
The government in their pre-sentence investigation report
suggested, and the trial court agreed, that under the MVRA, Brock-Davis
be ordered to pay restitution of $13,248.45 to the Aero Inn for damages
caused by the meth lab in room 107. Brock-Davis contested this
recommendation and on appeal argued MVRA did not authorize
restitution be paid under the circumstances of her conviction. The Ninth
Circuit though disagreed, in part. They first interpreted the statute, holding
"The MVRA limits restitution for an offense resulting in damage to or loss
or destruction of property to either the return of the property or, if that is
'impossible, impracticable, or inadequate,' to payment of 'the greater
of... the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or
destruction; or ... the value of the property on the date of sentencing,

less... the value(as of the date the property is returned) of any party of the
property that is returned." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(A)(b)(1). For guidance in
their construction of this statute, the Court looked to a similarly worded
statute, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 3663
and to the construction given by other circuits.
In the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits when dealing with
property damage caused by certain offenses that are similar to the damage
caused by a meth lab, mainly requiring decontamination by a hazmat
team, they have all held that "clean-up or repair costs may be ordered
under the MVRA." This outcome is consistent with the purpose of the
MVRA which was stated by the court that "the primary and overarching
goal of the MVRA is to make victims of crime whole."
Brock-Davis also unsuccessfully argued that Bissell was entitled to
restitution because he was "not directly and proximately harmed by the
criminal conduct to which she plead guilty," that being conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine. Her indictment did not reference the Aero
Inn room 7, Bissell, nor Kalispell and thus she argued they were not a
victim of the crime she plead guilty to. The court disagreed because of an
earlier holding interpreting the term victim to be broadly construed, they
held that "when the crime of conviction includes a scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern of criminal activity as an element of the offense,... the restitution
order may include acts of related conduct for which the defendant was not
convicted." Then applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the

court found that each motel room was at the minimum a partial meth lab
created by Brock-Davis, and the items found in the trunk of the car would
have "supplemented either lab (or even constituted the lab itself) at the
motels." Thus, the fact that the Kalispell motel wasn't mentioned in the
indictment doesn't prevent it from recovering restitution when room 107
itself was part of the conspiracy to manufacture meth.
Lastly, the court stated that "a cleanup and contamination effort
conducted by local emergency response agencies was a necessary and
foreseeable result of the defendant's offense conduct." They then held that
because Bissell had to decontaminate room 107 in order to be able to use it
and the contamination was a result of Brock-Davis' criminal conduct, she
properly bore the loss.
RYAN STARNES
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American Bird Conservancy. Inc. v. F.C.C., 2008 WL 425529 (D.C. Cir.
2008)
The American Bird Conservancy and Forest Conservation Council
sought review of a Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") order
that denied in part and dismissed in part petitioners' requests concerning
the protection of migratory birds from collisions with communications
towers in the Gulf Coast. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia deferred to the FCC's decision on one point, but remanded the
order back to the FCC as arbitrary and capricious because it failed to
adequately address the issues raised by the petitioners.
On August 26, 2002, troubled by the issue of "tower kill," the
petitioners made several formal requests to the FCC. They asked the FCC
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") under the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). They also asked the FCC to
formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") in
accordance with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") concerning the
impact of the towers on endangered bird species. Additionally, petitioners
requested the FCC to take action to reduce bird mortality at tower
locations pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"). Finally,
the petitioners asked the FCC to give them notice and an opportunity to be
heard before approving additional tower registration applications.
In August of 2003, while still considering the petitioners' requests,
the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry to obtain more information on the
nationwide impact of communications towers on migratory birds. The
agency undertook this action in order to determine if its rules needed to be
changed in order to provide better protection for migratory birds. Before
completion of the nationwide analysis, in April 2005, the FCC responded
to petitioners' concerns by issuing its order. The Commission dismissed
the migratory bird issue, reasoning that it would be addressed the separate
nationwide proceeding, and denied the petitioners' other requests.
The court ruled that the FCC acted reasonably in deferring
consideration of the MBTA issue to the ongoing nationwide proceeding,
however, it found that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by denying the petitioners other requests. The court noted that while FCC
regulations governing the application of NEPA categorically exclude
communications towers from requiring an EIS or an Environmental

Assessment ("EA"), a party can still make a challenge that a particular
action in such category will have a significant environmental impact. The
court concluded, based upon conflicting data regarding the number of
birds killed, that the FCC was at least required to prepare an EA and make
a finding of no significant impact to support its decision not to prepare an
EIS. Regarding the petitioners' request that the FCC consult with the
FWS over the cumulative effects of the towers on endangered species, the
court held that the FCC gave an inadequate explanation for determining
that its action would not affect endangered species habitats. The court
reasoned that by merely stating that there was no evidence of "synergies"
among the towers to conclude that the towers did not have a cumulatively
significant environmental impact, the FCC impermissibly foreclosed
virtually any possible request under this provision of the ESA. Finally, the
court ruled that the FCC's policy of providing public notice only after
approving tower applications did not provide petitioners with a
meaningful opportunity to participate in NEPA procedures as required by
regulation.
The dissent maintained that, even though the FCC order
technically constituted a final agency action, because the Commission had
not yet completed its proceeding involving the migratory bird question on
a national level, the issue was not ripe for review.
VALERIE NICKLAS
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Earth Island Institute v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 691 (9th Cir.
2007)
On January 18, 2008 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Earth Island Institute v. Ruthenbeck. The Plaintiff-Respondent in the
instant case, Earth Island, is challenging the promulgation of several
Forest Service regulations, which they contend unconstitutionally exempt
certain categories of Forest Service activities from administrative notice,
comment, and appeal.
The challenged regulations have the effect of categorically
excluding certain fire rehabilitation activities from Environmental
Assessment ("EA") or Environmental Impact Statement Analysis ("EIS").
When read together the regulations had the additional effect of excluding
the project from administrative notice, comment, and appeal.
Earth Island's complaint centers around, inter alia, the above
regulations as applied to the Burnt Ridge Project decision memo, although
notably the Forest Service had not yet carried through with the Burnt
Ridge Project. The district court found for Earth Island, invalidating the
aforementioned regulations and issuing a nationwide injunction against
their application. The Forest Service appealed the decision.
Before the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal the Forest Service and
Earth Island were able to reach an agreement regarding the Burnt Ridge
Project the dispute was settled and dismissed with prejudice.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit chose to allow the challenge to the two
regulations which had been applied to the Burnt Ridge Project Memo and
uphold the district court's invalidation of them.
The Forest Service challenges several aspects of the Ninth
Circuit's decision to continue to rule on the validity of the regulations after
the underlying conflict is dismissed. Among the Forest Service's
challenges they claim that because the agency did not go through with the
Burnt Ridge Project that the regulations were not ripe for review. The
Forest Service also contends that Earth Island's complaint became nonjusticiable when they settled their challenge to the Burnt Ridge Project.
Although this case may seem at first brush as simply a fact-specific
dispute, with no real consequences reaches further than the destiny of
Burnt Ridge, what is actually at stake is much greater. The regulations in
the instant case set up procedures for a special government program, under

which the Burnt Ridge Project was undertaken. Instead of simply
challenging the Burnt Ridge Project, Earth Island is now attempting to
challenge the underlying regulations and in turn a much more broad
regulatory apparatus set up by the Forest Service to deal with common
problems associated with forest fires.
The Court is now faced with the question of whether a challenger
to a regulation setting up a special government program can challenge the
regulations itself or if that challenge is limited to a particular project
undertaken under the new program. The court's decision accompanied
with the precedent set here of a national injunction on the challenged
regulations application could have devastating effects on agency
autonomy and ability to create special programs for common problems
which they face.
RYAN TICHENOR
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Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2007)
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, the plaintiffs, Defenders of
Wildlife and the Sierra Club, filed suit in the United States District Court
of the District of Columbia against the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Michael Chertoff, challenging the constitutionality of §102 of the REAL
ID Act of 2005. The controversy arose in September 2007.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) wanted to begin
construction of a border fence along the United States/Mexico border.
The fence would have run along road and drainage structures within the
San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area (SPRNCA) in Arizona.
SPRNCA is managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which
did a complete environmental assessment before granting a right-of-way
to begin fence construction, determining that such construction would
have no impact on the environment when paired with certain mitigation
precautions. Plaintiffs objected to the construction of the fence, arguing
that SPRNCA was "a unique and invaluable environmental resource," and
"one of the most biologically diverse areas of the United States."
However, BLM reported that no Environmental Impact Statement was
required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. In
response, Plaintiffs filed action in early October 2007 and simultaneously
moved for preliminary injunctive relief to stop construction. Their motion
claimed that BLM's environmental assessment was inadequate, and that
NEPA required a full Environmental Impact Statement. In addition,
Plaintiffs claimed that BLM's right-of-way violated the Arizona-Idaho
Conservation Act of 1988, which directs BLM to manage SPRNCA in a
"protective and enhancing manner," and to only allow SPRNCA to be
used for which it was established. The District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order,
finding a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to
Plaintiffs' NEPA claims, and construction was halted.
The victory was short-lived; by late October, DHS Secretary
Chertoff published a notice in the Federal Register waiving NEPA, the
Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act, and 18 other laws with respect to the
construction of the fence. Secretary Chertoff claimed waiver authority
under §102 of the REAL ID Act of 2005, asserting the waiver was

necessary in order for the fence to be built, and that the waiver met the
requirements laid out in §102. Subsequently, the District Court for the
District of Columbia vacated the temporary restraining order, and the
plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege that the waiver provision of
§102 violated separation of powers principles under Articles I and II of the
Constitution. In response, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that based on the Supreme Court's nondelegation line of cases, it
is constitutionally permissible for the legislature to delegate power to the
executive branch.
The District Court for the District of Columbia rejected Plaintiffs'
arguments, ultimately siding with the Secretary. The Court determined
that the Secretary's waiver authority under the REAL ID Act did not
violate separation of powers and was therefore constitutional. Rejecting
claims by the plaintiffs that such power was unprecedented and even equal
to the unconstitutional line item veto, the Court deemed such power to be
within the broad scope of the Executive Branch. It reasoned that the
Executive has general authority over matters of foreign policy and
security; therefore, any delegation by Congress to the Executive on these
issues will almost always be constitutional, regardless of how broad the
power is.
Missouri Courts' response to this ruling could be one of two
things. Either Missouri will support this decision, favoring the judicial
interpretation of appropriate authority over deferral to an agency
interpretation. Missouri has shown reluctance to defer to an agency
interpretation in the past, so it is quite possible that it will rely on this
decision as further support against adopting the Chevron doctrine.
However, it is possible that Missouri Courts will reject this decision,
showing reluctance to give so much credit to an agency interpretation.
Thus, Missouri's approval or rejection of Defenders of Wildlife depends
on how it analyzes the District Court's decision- was it judicial
interpretation of an act, or was it an agency's interpretation of an act
upheld by the judiciary? Missouri's answer will be an indication of
whether such measures can be taken in this state.
LAUREN SANDWEISS
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Missouri v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, et al., 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2802 (8th Cir. 2008).
The State of Missouri brought suit against the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") under the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"). Missouri alleged the Corps, through the implementation of
revisions to the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir Master Water Control
Manual ("Master Manual") and its failure to prepare a supplemental
environmental impact statement, violated the NEPA.
The Corps had prepared an assessment that included an evaluation
of a plan for a bimodal spring rise through which water would be released
from a dam in an effort to support endangered or threatened species. The
assessment found there was no new environmental impacts that were
significant that had not been previously evaluated in an environmental
impact statement. Additionally, the Master Manual was edited to include
the plan for the bimodal spring rise.
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted the Corp's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Missouri's
claims. This led Missouri to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit held the revision to the Master
Manual did not constitute a substantial change, a change that would have
required a supplemental environmental impact statement ("SEIS") under
40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i).
The court cited the alternatives for the spring rise previously
considered in the SEIS as the reason a new SEIS was unnecessary. The
court held the environmental assessment compared possible impacts of the
proposed bimodal rising of the spring to other options and concluded the
bimodal spring raising was permitted under the range of impacts
previously studied by the Corps. Finally, the court found the Corp's use of
an environmental assessment to evaluate the necessity of an SEIS was not
a misuse of the environmental assessment procedures or in violation of the
NEPA as a whole.
DAVID ZUGELTER

